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I ntrod uctio n
In January of 1975, Iowa Democratic Party activists and office holders
could not have been happier.

In the previous November's mid-term elections,

Iowans had elected or reelected five of the six Democratic candidates for the
U.S. House of Representatives, including newcomers Michael Blouin, Berkley
Bedell, and Tom Harkin.1

In addition, Democrats now controlled both

branches of the state legislature.

About the only thing for the state's

Democrats to be unhappy about was the situation in the Iowa Executive Council,
where the GOP controlled all seven offices (including that of governor). 2
Even so, what probably excited loyal Democrats more than anything else was
the election of former Second District Congressman John C. Culver to the
United States Senate. 3

The Culver election, coupled with the election two

years earlier of Culver's legislative assistant Dick Clark over then-incumbent
Sen. Jack Miller, marked only the second time in the state's history that two
Democrats had been elected in the same decade to the highest legislative body
in the nation. 4

Iowa had finally become a competitive two-party state.

What those jubilant Iowa Democrats did not know was that, within six
years, Iowa's two liberal Democratic senators would be replaced by two
conservative Republicans as a result of the 1978 and 1980 elections.

Possible

reasons for the 1972 and 1974 victories of Clark and Culver and their
1 Pam

Peglow, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 (Des Moines, Iowa: The
State of Iowa, 1975), 161-163.
2 1bid.,
164-169.
3 1bid.,
160-161.
4 Betty Lamberto, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1967-1968 Vol. 52 (Des Moines, Iowa: The
State of Iowa, 1967), 366-367. Iowa voters elected three Democrats to serve in the U.S. Senate
during the 1930s, Louis Murphy, Guy M. Gillette, and Clyde L. Herring.
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subsequent defeats in 1978 and 1980 will be the focus of this paper.

Limited

background information about Clark and Culver will be utilized to familiarize
the reader with the two candidates.

Through the use of newspaper articles and

public opinion polls from the Des Moines Register, the author will attempt to
explore the situational context of each of the four races.

Maps and charts will

show the geographical distribution and characteristics of the vote as well as a
way to link various demographic characteristics, such as urban/rural,
ethnicity, and religion (especially considering the alleged importance of the
issue of abortion and religion in politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s)
with noticible shifts of voters to or from either candidate from one election to
the next. 5

In addition, resources such as The Congressional Quarterly Guide

to Current American Government will help to put national perspective on the
elections.

In the interest of clarity, the election and defeat of Clark will be

discussed before the election and defeat of Culver.

Throughout the Culver

section, then, the author will look for similarities and differences between the
two candidates and their election contests.
Dick Clark and the Elections of 1972 and 1978

The story of Dick Clark's 1972 success in the race for the U.S. Senate is
the classic story of "home-town boy makes good."

Clark was born shortly

before the Great Depression on his grandfather's farm in Linn County.

After his

family moved to the Buchanan County town of Lamont in 1938, Clark spent most
of his childhood and teenage years helping his parents run their general store.
He was also an exceptional athlete in high school, playing baseball well enough
to be considered by a scout of the St. Louis Cardinals. 6
5 Unless otherwise noted, the percentages in this paper have been compiled and tallied by the

author.
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Following a short stint as a truck driver, Clark attended Upper Iowa
University in Fayette.

Although his college career was interrupted by the

outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Clark managed to finish school and later enroll
in graduate studies at the University of Iowa in 1954 to study European
history .7

The Clark that emerged from college and military service (he added

fluency in German and Russian to his knowledge of European history) differed
markedly from the Clark who had never excelled academically in high school.
After receiving his M.A. in history, he returned to Upper Iowa University to
teach Russian, history, and political science. 8 Clark also served as a
Democratic precinct captain in Fayette.
As a result of the success of his election-day canvassing in Fayette,
Clark was introduced to Second District Congressional Candidate John Culver
and, subsequently, became Culver's most important assistant from his first
congressional campaign in 1964 until Clark left his staff in 1971. 9 As
Culver's chief assistant, Clark spent most of his time in Cedar Rapids rather
than Washington, D.C., continuously gauging local political sentiment, informing
Culver of community developments in the Second District, and helping to build
a successful constituent-service network system.1 o In this way, Clark
became well-known to party activists in the area.
Most Iowa Democrats expected Culver to challenge incumbent Sen. Jack
Miller for the Senate in 1972 and Clark to succeed Culver as Second District
6James Flansburg, "The Story of Dick Clark's Success," Des Moines Register, 12
November 1972, 1 (B) and 3 (B).
7 1bid.
8 1bid.
9

James C. Larew, A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa. 1950-1974 (Iowa City, Iowa:
Iowa State Historical Department, Division of the State Historical Society, 1980), 143-144. Also
Flansburg, 3 (B).
10 Larew, 157.
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Congressman.

After researching the idea and deciding that Miller was too

entrenched politically to be challenged successfully, Culver publicly announced
that he would not be a candidate for the Senate.

Less than two weeks

following Culver's surprise announcement, Clark declared his own candidacy for
the Senate. 11

Clark apparently was encouraged by the absence of a bitter

primary fight for the nomination (as a result of the assumption that Culver
would be the automatic nominee) and the vulnerable voting record of Miller,
which Clark had researched for Culver in 1971.
Literally unknown outside the Second District, Clark waged an underdog
campaign from the beginning, attacking Miller's record on Vietnam, Medicare,
Social Security, insurance rates, and the eighteen year-old vote.12 In the
closing days of the campaign Clark launched a blistering attack on Miller,
accusing him of being beholden to special interests in the insurance
industry. 13

The weekend before the election, the Register predicted that

Miller would win by a margin of 52-47%, but a closer look at the Iowa Polls
conducted by the paper shows that Clark had been gaining on Miller since May,
as indicated in the graph on the following page.14
When all the votes were counted, Clark had upset Miller by garnering
55.5% of the two-party vote. 15
11 Ibid.,

In the days following the election, Clark

169.
170.
13
William Simbro, "Clark Credits Success to His 1,300-Mile Hike," Des Moines Register,
8 November 1972, 7 (A).
14 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1971-1972 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines
Register, 1972), 522, 538, 551, and 556. In all the graphs containing head-to-head races, the
polls with asterisks denote the final numbers that the Register predicted for each candidate based on
the leanings of the remaining undecided voters.
15 L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register. 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa: The
State of Iowa, 1973), 162-163.
12 Ibid.,
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attributed his success to his now-famous 1,300-mile walk across the state
during the summer of 1972. 16 The walk itself, during which he donned a khaki
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safari outfit, apparently gave Clark enough visibility to overcome his unknown
status and Miller's edge in statewide name recognition.

In addition, the Qll

Moines Register credited other factors for Clark's success, such as the
aforementioned well-placed attacks on Miller and the fact that Clark's
campaign war chest, at over $200,000, was incredibly well-stocked for a
challenger. 17

Clark also benefitted from the first ever attempt of the Iowa

Democratic Party to initiate a voter identification and get-out-the-vote
drive.1 8

In addition to Clark's victory, Democrats won three of the six House

races and provided George McGovern with 41 % of the state's popular vote, his
16 Simbro.
17James Flansburg, "Ray Is Easy Winner for Reelection, Close Race for Neu, Gannon, "
Moines Register, a November 1972, 7 (A).
170-171 .
18Larew,

Oil
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ninth best showing in the country .1 9
On a national scale, the success of Democratic candidates was mixed.
President Richard M. Nixon won a landslide of historical proportions, getting
521 electoral votes from forty-nine states.

At the same time, however, Nixon

appeared to have short coattails as the GOP only gained twelve seats in the
House and had a net loss of two seats in the Senate. 20 According to
Congressional Quarterly, Clark would be part of a slightly more liberal Senate
as six of the thirteen new Senators were tagged as either liberal or moderate
which was an increase, considering that nine of the thirteen they were
replacing were regarded as conservative. 21
The information given about the reasons for Clark's victory can only serve
as speculation, both on the part of Clark and on the part of the Des Moines
Register.

Clark's attacks on Miller's record, his walking campaign style, and

what was happening on the national scene cannot really be translated into
concrete, quantifiable explanations for his success.

One way to produce such

quantifiable explanations for Clark's electoral success is through comparing
and contrasting a particular race or with other contests in the same
geographical area.

Another method of obtaining quantifiable results is by

examining the geography of the election and then attempting to link various
demographic characteristics with the vote in certain areas of the state.
methods will be used in this paper.

Both

The information needed for such analysis

will be included within the text (in the case of charts) or at the end of the
paper (in the case of maps).

Map 1 at the end of this paper shows all of the

19 1bid.

20 Robert

A. Diamond, ed., The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American
Government. Spring 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), 1-15.
21 Ibid.,

5.
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counties in the state and their names.

This map will serve as a reference for

the reader.
Map 2 shows the percentage of the Democratic vote in Iowa counties in
the Clark-Miller race. 22

From this map, a few general statements can be

made regarding the geographical distribution of the vote.

First, Clark did well

in the large majority of counties, winning seventy-three of the ninety-nine.
Clark's victory was also relatively widespread, but he did particularly well in
the Second District counties of Linn, Jackson, and Dubuque where he had been
working full-time building Culver's constituent-service network.

Clark also

scored over 60% in Benton and Johnson counties (both bordering on the Second
District) as well as in Des Moines, Wapello, Story, and Carroll counties.

The

few pockets of anti-Clark counties or pro-Miller counties were located in
extreme northwest and southwest Iowa.

In addition, four counties in the Third

District (Butler, Bremer, Franklin, and Grundy counties) also voted heavily for
Miller.
Map 3 shows the relative change in the percentage of the Democratic vote
from 1966 to 1972.23

One would expect Clark's percentages to show marked

increases over those that the Democrat in 1966, E.B. Smith, received in his poor
showing against Miller.

From the map, one can see that Clark had, at the very

least, a 20% increase in every county in the state.

The largest increases came

in the northwest corner of Iowa, a traditional Republican stronghold, and the
eastern one-quarter of the state, the part of Iowa where Clark was best22 Ahern, 162-163.
23 1bid. Also Lamberto,

411-412. The term "relative change" throughout this paper, as
compared to the term "absolute change," means that, for example, if Clark received 20% of the twoparty vote in 1972 and 40% of the two-party vote in 1978, his relative percentage increase would be
100%, because he doubled his earlier showing. Clark's absolute percentage increase, however, would
only be 20%, i.e., Clark only gained twenty points in absolute terms from 1972-1978.
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known.
When compared to the other statewide races, Clark's win was impressive
indeed.

The statewide Democratic ticket only received about 44% of the

vote. 24

Clark thus did almost twelve points better than the other Democrats

running statewide.

The question is, however, did Clark do about twelve points

better than his fellow Democrats everywhere?

By examining the statewide

results for a relatively obscure race, Auditor of State, one can attempt to
answer the above question.

Map 4, the percentage of the Democratic vote for

the 1972 Auditor's race, when compared with Map 2 shows that, in quite a few
counties, Clark ran better than twelve points ahead of the Democratic
candidate for Auditor. 25

It should be noted that the Democratic candidate for

Auditor ran behind the statewide Democratic ticket, 40.9% compared with 44%;
as a result, Clark did about fifteen points better than the Democratic candidate
for auditor.
In only nine counties did both Clark and the Democratic candidate for
Auditor of State receive similar enough percentages of the vote to put those
counties in the same category in the legends on the two corresponding maps
(Mills, Montgomery, Page, Butler, Sioux, Lyon, Shelby and Dallas).

For example,

Mills County was in the group of least Democratic counties for both contests.
In the other ninety counties, Clark's percentage of the vote was usually much
higher than the Auditor candidate's percentage.

As a result, the counties in the

over 60% Democratic and the 50.1-59.9% Democratic groupings in Map 2 are
24 1n this paper, the term "statewide Democratic ticket" refers to all races in a given year in
which the two major-party candidates for those offices ran in all ninety-nine counties, with the
exception of the U.S. Senate contest. For example, in 1972, the statewide ticket consisted of the
Democratic candidates for President, Governor, Secretary of State, Agriculture, Treasury, Attorney
General, and Auditor of State.
25Ahern,
168-169.
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usually found in the 40-49.9% Democratic or the less than 40% Democratic
groupings in Map 3. Clark scored about the same percentage ahead of the
Auditor, and probably the other statewide candidates, in nearly every part of
the state.
The three demographic characteristics mentioned at the beginning of this
paper will now be accounted for.

When the data contained in Map 16 is

combined with the average Democratic vote in each of the four categories
listed on that map, one can compare Clark's vote in urban areas with that in
rural areas.26

In the least urban counties, Clark received an average of 49.4%

of the vote, or about six points under his statewide figure.

The more urban the

county, the larger percentage of the vote Clark received, with one small
exception, as Table 1 below indicates.

Interestingly, the category containing

the most urban counties was the only category for this demographic
characteristic in which Clark did better than he did in the state as a whole.
Table 1.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1972
% Urban
% Dem. 1972
0-23 (n=23)
49.4
23-45.9 (n=44)
53.1
46-68.9 (n=19)
50.3
69-92.1 (n=13)
58.4
Map 17 shows the percentage of Iowa counties' German-born populations
in 1885.27

German-Americans are by far the largest ancestry group in the

state, making them the obvious group to examine in an attempt to try to
26 u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1980, part

17, General Population Characteristics: Iowa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
17-17 to 17-18 and 17-232 to 17-240.

1982),

27 The State of Iowa, Census of Iowa for the Year 1885 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa,

1885),

164-166.
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determine how much relationship, if any, existed between ancestry and voting
behavior.

Assuming that the influence of the German-born in Iowa in 1885 can

be extended to the types of people that still live in those counties today, one
can proceed with the same type of analysis that was used in the preceding
paragraph.

The counties that could be classified the least German in 1885

were the weakest supporters of Clark's candidacy in 1972; likewise, the most
German counties in 1885 were the most pro-Clark, as shown in the table below.
Table 2.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the 1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1972
% German
% Dem. 1972
0-4 (n=47)
51.8
5-9 (n=31)
52.1
10-14 (n=14)
53.6
15-or more (n=7)
56.1

The upward progression in the percentages as the counties got more and more
German was uninterrupted, i.e., there appears to be a direct relationship
between Clark's percentages and the counties with heavy German ancestry,
even though the relationship between German ancestry and voting behavior was
weaker than that between urbanism and voting.
The final demographic characteristic is religion.

The subject of religion

has been divided into three distinct categories representing the three largest
denominations in the state:

Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and United Methodist.

As with urbanism and German ancestry, the larger the Catholic percentage of
church members (see Map 18), the larger Clark's share of the vote in 1972, as
indicated in Table 3 on the following page. 28

The reason for the strong pro-

28 National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membership jn

the United States. 1980: An Enumeration

by Region. State. and County Based on Data Reported by 111
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Clark vote in heavily Catholic counties probably stems from the fact that
Catholics have long been part of the Iowa Democratic Party's base of support.
Table 3.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1972
% Catholic
% Dem. 1972
4-14 (n=30)
46.5
15-29 (n=37)
53.8
30-44 (n=24)
55.9
45-81 (n=8)
57.7

The relationship between the pro-Clark vote and the counties with large
percentages of their respective populations belonging to a Lutheran church is
less convincing than the other characteristics mentioned thus far, i.e., there is
no clear, direct relationship between the 1972 Senate vote and Lutheran church
membership.

As Table 4 below indicates, Clark received a majority of the vote

in each of the four categories shown on Map 19, but the percentages establish
no clear pattern and, hence, no direct causal relationship. 29
Table 4.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1972
% Lutheran
% Dem. 1972
0-14 (n=33)
53.2
15-29 (n=37)
50.6
30-44 (n=20)
54.5
45-71 (n=9)
52.7

The final demographic characteristic dealing with religion, the
percentage of counties' populations classified as Methodist, is also the final
demographic characteristic that is used in this study.30

Unlike any of the

Church Bodies (Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 102-111.
29 1bid.
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other demographic characteristics used for the 1972 election results, there
appears to be an inverse relationship between counties with high percentages
of Methodists and a strong pro-Clark vote.

The two least Methodist categories

of counties (see Map 20) had the highest pro-Clark average percentages, and the
two most Methodist categories of counties had the lowest pro-Clark average
percentages, as can be seen in the following table.
Table 5.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1972
% Methodist
% Dem. 1972
3-14 (n=20)
53.0
15-26 (n=47)
53.7
27-38 (n=23)
51.3
39-56 (n=9)
47.2

Finally, the average percentages in the most Methodist counties corresponds
highly with the figures that Clark received from the least Catholic counties.
Often, the more Catholic a county is, the less Methodist it is as well which
also accounts for this inverse relationship between high percentages of
Methodists and low Clark percentages.
The widespread nature of Clark's surprise victory in 1972 (refer again to
Map 2) over an incumbent senator made his subsequent defeat in 1978 to
former Lt. Gov. Roger Jepsen difficult to understand.

This was especially true

considering the high approval ratings that Clark had received, as evidenced in
the following bar graph.31
30 1bid.

31 The percentages contained in the two graphs are taken from the year-end publications of

Iowa Polls by the Des Moines Register. Rather than listing all of the sources used to make this graph
and the graph of Culver's approval ratings, found later in the paper, the reader should simply refer to
the section in the Bibliography containing the entries for the Iowa Polls used in this study.
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The graph shows that, with the exception of the first two Iowa Polls
taken in 1973, 60% or more of the Iowans polled supported Clark from late
1973 through the end of 1976. Clark peaked near 70% in January of 1977.
Apparently, the heat of the campaign caused some slippage in Clark's numbers
in 1978 as he temporarily dipped down to 52% approval while his disapproval
rating shot up to 20%.

Clark reversed the short-term downward slide by

September 1978 when the Iowa Poll reported that he stood at 60% approval. 32
The fact that Clark's negatives remained as high as they had been in March of
1978 is significant, even though he recovered from the hemorrhaging that he
apparently suffered in his approval ratings in the early and middle part of
1978.

This is significant because it shows that Jepsen, his opponent, was

32 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines
Register, 1978), 902 .
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having some success keeping Clark's negatives higher than they had normally
been throughout his term in office.

What kind of effort was Jepsen making to

show Clark in an unfavorable light?
Jepsen based his entire strategy on high turnout by a coalition of narrowfocus groups, each of whose sole purpose in the 1978 Senate election was to
defeat Dick Clark. 33

He was expected to raise at least $600,000 from groups

that were pro-life, anti-gun control, anti-Panama Canal Treaty, pro-business,
and anti-labor. 34

One of Jepsen's television ads even featured the main

conservative politician in the United States:
Reagan of California. 35

then former Governor Ronald

Clark, for his part, sought to strike much broader

themes to try to deflect the negative criticism that he had received on such
issues as U.S. involvement in Angola, his yes vote on the Panama Canal
Treaties, his pro-choice position, and his opposition to tuition tax credits for
parents who chose to send their children to private or parochial schools.

He

himself was expected to raise over $800,000 from various liberal special
interest PAC's.36
The Register reported that the 1978 race for the Senate appeared to
center more on ideological differences between the two candidates and the
effectiveness of single-issue voter groups than previous elections had.

In one

article written after the election, both candidates were accused by the
Register of hurling the dirty words ·1ibera1· and ·conservative• too much
without taking enough time to debate the issues that affected the majority of
33 Dennis

Farney, "Clark-Jepsen Race: Clear-Cut Test of Single-Interest Groups' Power,•
(Editorial) Des Moines Register, 1 November 1978, 14 (A).
34 1bid.

35 1bid.
36 1bid.
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lowans. 37 The candidates, according to the Register had made the focus of the
campaign too broad.

In another article, the Register claimed that voters were

focusing too much on these single issues without taking enough time to look at
the broad picture of each candidate's record and beliefs and the effect that
such beliefs might have on broad areas of policy. 38

In other words, while the

candidates' campaigns had become too broad, the voters had become too
narrow-minded.
Even with all the talk of single-issue voters and the liberal and
conservative labels, Clark appeared to have held the lead throughout the
campaign.

As can be seen in the following graph, a slight narrowing had taken

place between the incumbent and the challenger as election day neared, albeit a
smaller narrowing than had occurred in the 1972 Clark-Miller contest.

The

Iowa Poll, after factoring in undecided voters, predicted that Clark would hold
on and win by a margin of 54-45%.39
When the final votes were counted, Jepsen had upset Clark by getting
51.6% compared to Clark's 48.4%

Immediately following the election, the

Register credited Jepsen's victory to the fact that the GOP had done a better
job of getting its partisans to vote.

Turnout appeared to be higher than normal

in the rural counties and lower than normal in the big-city counties, another
factor the Register gave for the Jepsen win. 40 One factor that the Register
37 James Flansburg, "New 'Dirty Names' From Iowa's 1978 U.S. Senate Race,• (Editorial)
Des Moines Register, 9 November 1978, 17 (A).
38 Farney.
39 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978, 911.
40 The Regjster based this claim on the fact that the turnout in the seven most urban counties

(Black Hawk, Dubuque, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie, Scott, and Woodbury) was 20,000 votes less in
1978 than in 1974, the preceding off-year election. According to my calculations, the decrease in the
seven most urban counties was a little over 16,000 votes, which turned out to be a 5.5% decrease in
the turnout in these counties. In addition, the Register stated that the rural turnout was heavier in
1978 than in 1974. According to my calculations, however, the turnout in the twenty-three most
rural counties actually decreased 11.4% from 1974 to 1978, a larger decrease than was found in the
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denied having a pivotal outcome on the race was the abortion issue, reporting
that their study indicated that abortion ·added no more than 25,000 votes to
Jepsen's total.•

If this is the case, though, abortion had a significant impact on

the race as Jepsen only beat Clark by about 26,000 votes.

Logically, if even

half of the 25,000 voters who voted for Jepsen because of abortion would have
otherwise voted for Clark, Clark may well have won the election.
Clark, for his part, blamed his loss on the fact that 1978 was a more
negative year than most, both in terms of the mood of the electorate and in
terms of media coverage.
than the Democrats.

He also credited the GOP with having better turnout

Perhaps most importantly, Clark blamed the persistence

of single-issue interest groups, especially anti-abortion groups, in painting
seven most urban counties. The Register may have confused the larger Republican margin of victory
in many of these rural counties for an increased turnout. For example, in Adair County, Stanley beat
Culver by about 200 votes in 1974, but Jepsen beat Clark by about 300 votes in 1978. This
occurred even as the turnout in Adair County from 1974 to 1978 decreased 6.8%.
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him as out-of-touch with the views of most lowans. 41
In the rest of the state, Democrats fared about as poorly as Clark.

Iowa's

House delegation, on which Democrats had outnumbered Republican four to two,
now stood at three Democrats and three Republicans.

This was due to Tom

Tauke's defeat of Michael Blouin in the Second Congressional District.
Republicans also gained control of both houses of the Iowa General Assembly,
compiling post-election margins of 28-22 in the Senate and 56-44 in the
House.

About the only thing that Iowa Democrats could be happy about was the

election of a Democrat to the Executive Council as Tom Miller ousted Richard
Turner for the post of Attorney General. 4 2
On the national scene, Republicans gained ground on the Democrats in both
houses of Congress as well as winning more gubernatorial races than they had
expected. Overall, the GOP gained three seats in the Senate, and more
importantly for them, added more conservatives to their ranks than they had
had before with the addition of Roger Jepsen (IA), William Armstrong (CO), and
Gordon Humphrey (NH). The Republicans made modest gains in the U.S. House
and gubernatorial races, picking up twelve and six seats, respectively. 43
What kinds of geographical distributions in the Iowa vote did this study
find for 1978?

By looking at Map 5, one can see that Clark only won twenty-

three of the counties compared to the seventy-three that he won six years
earlier. 44

He only had one area in which he did consistently well:

the central

41 Marjorie Randon Hershey, Running for Office: The Political Education of Campaigners

(Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1984), 190.
42

The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978 (Des Moines,
Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1978), n.p.
43

Patricia Ann O'Connor, ed., The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American
Government, Spring 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1979), 89-105.
44 The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978.

18
portion of the state centering around Polk and Dallas counties.
exceptionally well in Johnson County.

Clark also did

Jepsen did best in the northwest and

southwest sections, two historically Republican areas, as well as parts of
northeast Iowa.

By looking at the two maps, one notices that many of the

counties that had given Clark between 50.1% and 59.9% in 1974 only gave him
between 40% and 49.9% in 1978.
Map 6 shows the relative change in the Democratic share of the vote from
1972 to 1978. 45

Notice that Clark actually had a percentage increase in five

of the counties on the map; however, he still lost four of those five, winning
only Audubon County.

Notice also that Clark had relatively large percentage

decreases in much of east central, northeast, and west central Iowa, and his
largest percentage decreases came in Allamakee, Floyd, Grundy, and Woodbury
counties, two of which he won in 1972.

If one compares Map 6 with Map 3, one

can see that Clark had heavy losses in 1978 in places where he had had sizable
increases in 1972 over Smith's 1966 totals.

These areas included parts of

west central, east central, and northeast Iowa.

In ways, then, the 1978

election may have been a return to normalcy, at least in terms of the way that
the Democratic candidate preformed in 1966.

Map 7 also shows that Clark lost

much of his support in the eastern one-quarter of the state as well as in a
section of west central lowa.4 6
Finally, Map 8, containing the geographical distribution of the vote in the
1978 Auditor's election, has been inserted to compare Clark's showing with
another statewide race. 47

Remember, in 1972 Clark ran about twelve points

4 5Ahern, 162-163. Also The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November

7. 1978.
46 1bid.
47

The State of Iowa,

Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978.
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ahead of the Democratic ticket as a whole and about fifteen points ahead of the
Democratic candidate for Auditor.

In 1978, the Democratic ticket as a whole

received 44.4% of the vote; thus, Clark still ran ahead of the ticket as a whole
but only by about four points.

He also ran closer to the Democratic candidate

for Auditor (only a six point difference between the two) than he did in the
previous election.

Interestingly, when comparing both maps for Auditor (4 and

8), one can conclude that the vote in the Auditor's race was much more stable
from one election to the next than the vote in the senate contest.
The demographic characteristics examined for the 1972 election have
also been examined for the 1978 election.

For example, the urban/rural

demographic characteristic shows the same pattern in 1978 as it did in 1972,
i.e., Clark did better in the most urban counties and did poorest in the least
urban counties in Map 16.

Starting with the least urban counties and continuing

to the most urban counties, Clark received 43.2%, 44.9%, 44.7% and 51.1 %.
Table 6.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote
According to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978
% Urban
%
0-23 (n=23)
23-45.9 (n=44)
46-68.9 (n=19)
69-92.1 (n=13)

Dem. 1972
49.4
53.1
50.3
58.4

% Dem. 1978
43.2
44.9
44.7
51.1

Absolute Change
-6.2
-8.2
-5.6
-7.3

Relative Change
-13
-15
-11

-12

Although each of these numbers is significantly lower than those Clark
received in each category of counties in 1972, one can only tell how much
lower by examining the percentage decrease according to the degree of
urbanism in each of the four categories of counties listed in the legend in Map
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16.

As the table above shows, the urban/rural cleavage cannot really be

considered a factor in Clark's defeat as his percentage of the vote declined
about the same amount in each of the four categories of counties.
The information on the most and least German counties tells a much
different story than did the information on urban/rural differences within the
state.

In 1972, for example, the most German counties backed Clark's

candidacy stronger than any of the other three categories of counties on Map
17, giving him about 56% of the vote.

In a dramatic turnaround, the least

German counties became Clark's biggest supporters in 1978.

Unlike 1972,

Clark's share of the vote differed little between the most and the least German
counties.

Perhaps more significant is the fact that the most German counties

accounted for the largest percentage decreases of the four categories found on
Map 17, as shown in the table below.
Table 7.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the
1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978
% German % Dem. 1972
0-4 (n=47)
51.8
5-9 (n=31)
52.1
10-14 (n=14)
53.6
15-or more (n= 7)56.1

% Dem. 1978
47.2
43.7
42.7
44.5

Absolute Change
-4.6
-8.4
-10.9
-11.6

Relative Change
-9
-16
-20
-21

Some have speculated that religion's impact on the 1978 vote was closely
linked to the issue of abortion. 48 The Register said that, at the very most, the
abortion factor accounted for 25,000 votes for Jepsen but that that amount
was not enough to change the course of the election.
48 Hershey,

190.

Peter Hart, a Democratic
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pollster, found in a post-election survey that roughly 4% (about 26,000 voters)
of those voting changed their preference because of the abortion question.49
Theoretically, a strong anti-Clark vote from large numbers of pro-life voters
could have made the difference, or at least contributed in a significant way to
a loose coalition of anti-Clark special interest groups.
Iowa Poll printed on November 5, 1978, the

Interestingly, in an

Register reported that 4% of the

electorate said that abortion was the most important issue regarding how they
would vote in the Clark-Jepsen race.so
Because abortion is so often linked with religion, if abortion really had
an impact on the outcome of the race, one should be able to see significant
losses for Clark in those counties in which the dominant religion opposed
abortion.

The Roman Catholic Church, strong in parts of Iowa as well as Iowa's

largest denomination, has always taken a strong pro-life view.

If the views of

Catholics at large are consistent with the views of the church hierarchy, then
one should see a slide in Clark's support in the most Catholic counties.
However, finding evidence that the views of the laity and the church hierarchy
coincide is difficult, as most Gallup polls taken on the subject show little
difference between Catholics' and Protestants' views on abortion. 5 1
Any evidence that suggests that Catholic church members were more
opposed to abortion than Protestant church members and thus in accord with
the church hierarchy would help to establish that religion influenced the prolife/anti-Clark vote.
evidence.

The Register, in 1978, produced two such pieces of

First, an Iowa Poll printed on October 22 reported that the state's

49 1bid.
50

51

oes Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978, 911 .

George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion. 1978 (Wilmington, Delaware:
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1979), 32-33.
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Catholics, by a 2-1 margin, favored either banning abortions altogether on
permitting them only to save the life of the mother whereas Protestants, by a
3-2 margin, favored allowing abortion under broader circumstances.52 Thus,
the Catholic/Protestant cleavage on the issue of abortion that the Gallup Poll
failed to find working at the national level apparently had the potential to
work at the Iowa level.

In addition, 12% of the state's voting Catholics,

compared with only 4% of all Iowans, ranked abortion as the most important
issue in the 1978 senate race. 5 3
If there really was a link between abortion, religion, and the Clark loss,
the numbers should show significant losses for Clark in the heavily Catholic
areas of the state as well as smaller losses in the more Protestant areas of
the state.

Remember, in 1972, the most Catholic counties had been Clark's

biggest supporters, giving him almost 58% of the vote.

In 1978, the most

Catholic counties supported Clark at about the same level as the other three
categories of counties found in Map 18.

Going from the least Catholic counties

to the most Catholic counties, Clark received 41.5%, 46.9%, 46.9%, and 46.8% of
the vote.

More important, perhaps, is the percentage drop for each of the four

categories as shown in the table below.
Table 8.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote
According to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978
% Catholic %
4-14 (n=30)
15-29 (n=37)
30-44 (n=24)
45-81 (n=8)
52

Dem. 1972
46.5
53.8
55.9
57.7

% Dem. 1978
41.5
46.9
46.9
46.8

Absolute Change
-5.0
-6.9
-9.0
-10.9

Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978, 909.
911.

53 1bid.,

Relative Change
-11
-13
-16
-19
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As the table shows, Clark suffered his heaviest losses in the most Catholic
counties.

Apparently, the abortion issue moved enough Catholics to vote

against Clark to contribute to the Jepsen victory.
Linking the Lutheran vote to the abortion issue is much more difficult to
do since no Iowa poll breaks down the Protestant denominations into separate
categories such as Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and so on.

The official

statements of the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in
America, by far the two largest Lutheran bodies in the United States at the
time, each published somewhat middle-of-the-road statements on abortion,
affirming the right of women to make the choice to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy yet, at the same, time urging all those who are considering such a
profound move to consider the impact of the decision. 54

Because the Lutheran

bodies took such middle-of-the-road positions, it would be hard to link the
decrease, if any, in the Clark vote in the most Lutheran counties, the next most
Lutheran counties, and so on with the subject of abortion.

In addition, the

second largest Lutheran body in Iowa at the time was the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod, a far more conservative church on social issues.

Because the

author grouped all Lutherans together rather than separating the conservative
Lutherans from the moderate Lutherans, any clear link between the vote in
heavily Lutheran counties and the pro or anti-Clark vote would be hard to
establish.
As Table 9 indicates, going from least Lutheran counties to the most
Lutheran counties, Clark received averages in 1978 of 48.1 %, 42.7%, 45.9%, and
54 The American Lutheran Church, Office of Church in Society, Abortion: A Series of

Statements of The American Lutheran Church. 1974. 1976, and 1980 (Minneapolis, Minnesota:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1980), 9-12. Also Lutheran Church in America, Division for Mission
in North America, Social Statements of the American Lutheran Church: Sex. Marriage. and Family
(New York, New York: Lutheran Church in America, 1970), 4-5.
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44%.

In addition, no clear correlation existed between either the most or least

Lutheran counties and the percentage drop from 1972 to 1978.
Table 9.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote
According to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978
% Lutheran % Dem. 1972
53.2
0-14 (n=33)
15-29 (n=37)
50.6
30-44 (n=20)
54.5
45-71 (n=9)
52.7

% Dem. 1978
48.1
42.7
45.9
44.0

Absolute Change
-5.1
-7.9
-8.6
-8.7

Relative Change
-10
-16
-16
-16

Linking the Methodist counties to the abortion issue is easier in the sense
that the Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church issued very
liberal stands on the subject of abortion. 55

In addition, the Annual Conference

that met in 1979 commended Dick Clark, himself a United Methodist, for the
work that he had done in the Senate to promote world peace. 56

Because the

Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church is composed of church
hierarchy, local pastors, .and. local laity, it should not be surprising that,
although Clark was supported the least in the most Methodist counties in 1972,
those same counties supported him in 1978 at about the same rate as the other
three categories of counties found in Map 20.

In fact, the most Methodist

counties in 1978 provided Clark with the smallest percentage drop of any of
the categories of counties in any of the other demographic characteristics used
in this study.
55 Charles D. Gilbert, Journal and Official Records: 1974 Iowa Annual Conference of the
United Methodist Church Vol. 2 (Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist

Church,
56

1974),

396.

Jill D. Stanton, Journal and Official Records: 1979 Iowa Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church Vol. 2 (Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
1979), 363.
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Table 10.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote
According to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978
% Methodist
3-14 (n=20)
15-26 (n=47)
27-38 (n=23)
39-56 (n=9)

% Dem. 1972
53.0
53.7
51.3
47.2

% Dem. 1978
43.3
46.3
45.1
45.0

Absolute Change
-9.7
-7.4
-6.2
-2.2

Relative Change
-18
-14
-12
-5

While the methods that have been used in this study cannot prove the
reasons for either Clark's surprise victory over Miller in 1972 or his surprise
defeat by Jepsen in 1978, they can at least point to some groups of Iowans who
appear to have given Clark the support that contributed to his 1972 victory
(urban Iowans, Iowans of German ancestry, and Catholics) as well as groups
that helped contribute to his 1978 defeat (rural Iowans, Iowans of German
ancestry, and Catholics).

Even though the results of the study are not

conclusive, they have been arrived at through more scientific means than the
mere speculation given by the candidates themselves or by the major media.
The Culver election of 1974 and his subsequent defeat in 1980 will be dealt
with in the same manner.

In addition, some comparisons between the elections

and defeats of both men will be made.

John Culver and the Elections of 1974 and 1980
On the surface, the Culver election of 1974 and defeat of 1980 would
appear to be similar to the Clark races in 1972 and 1978.

After all, both

Culver and Clark grew up in Eastern Iowa's Second Congressional District and
relied on on that district's urban triangle--Cedar Rapids, Clinton, and Dubuque-for much of their traditional Democratic base.

Both also were considered
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liberal and won their elections to the Senate in the early 1970s.

Most of all,

both failed to win second terms and were beaten by conservative Republicans.
After exploring these similarities, however, one must stretch to find many
examples of parallels between the two men and their candidacies.

Indeed, their

backgrounds and the circumstances surrounding their elections and defeats
were quite different.
Whereas Clark had grown up poor in rural towns during the Great
Depression, Culver came from a Cedar Rapids family that was prominent and
relatively well off, if not wealthy by Iowa standards. 57

Clark could only

afford to attend a small liberal arts college close to home, Upper Iowa; Culver
chose to continue a family tradition by attending Harvard University in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, as both his father and grandfather had done. 58
While at Harvard Culver participated in varsity football, playing well enough to
be drafted by the Chicago Cardinals. s9 Even the sport of choice of the two
men differed as Clark was a hometown baseball great!
Politically, Culver shared the Republican outlook of his parents
throughout most of his college career.

It was not until his graduate studies in

Cambridge, England, his service in the U.S. Marine Corps, and his subsequent
studies at Harvard Law School that he evolved into a liberal Democrat.

Much of

the reason for this evolution can be attributed to the fact that his law school
years allowed Culver to become involved heavily in the 1962 senatorial
campaign of Ted Kennedy, Culver's close friend and former roommate at
Harvard. 60
57 Larew,
58 1bid.

59 1bid.

After serving a brief stint as Kennedy's legislative assistant,
139.
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Culver returned to Cedar Rapids in 1964 to successfully run for the Second
District House seat.

Culver's personal campaign style and close association

with the Kennedy family helped him win reelection in 1966, 1968, 1970, and
1972.
The 1972 campaign is considered by many today to be a missed
opportunity on Culver's part.

Most Iowa Democrats had hoped that Culver would

challenge Jack Miller for the senate seat, but Culver decided that Miller was
too popular to beat.

Because of Dick Clark's surprising upset of Miller, Culver

had to bank his chances of winning a senate seat on the 1974 retirement of
Harold Hughes.

From the outset, even the victories of Clark and Culver were

different as Clark had to overcome an incumbent whereas Culver competed for
an open seat that his party had controlled previously.

Culver also had the

advantage of being a Democrat in what had the potential to be a big Democratic
year, for the 1974 election came shortly after Watergate and President Nixon's
humiliating downfall.

Clark, two years earlier, had to run as a Democrat in the

Nixon landslide.
Culver used Watergate as well as issues relating to the economy,
defense, taxes, health care, and his ten-year cumulative voting record in the
House against his opponent David Stanley, a veteran of the Iowa General
Assembly and the unsuccessful GOP senatorial candidate against Hughes in
1968. 61

According to Iowa Polls taken throughout the spring and summer, the

candidates were locked in a relatively close race, as can be seen in the graph
on the following page.

60lbid.,

61

140-141.

Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1973-1974, 652.
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Even after Culver had taken the lead in the September poll, Stanley narrowed
the race in October but not enough to overcome Culver's early fall surge.

When

all the votes were cast, Culver beat Stanley with 52.4% of the statewide twoparty vote, essentially by the same margin that the Register had predicted. 62
Nationally, the 1974 election lived up to its billing as a heavily
Democratic year.

In the Senate, the Democrats picked up three seats, extending

their majority over the Republicans to 61-39.

Many senators elected in 1974

are still serving in that office today, including Dale Bumpers (AR), Wendell
Ford (KY), John Glenn (OH), and Patrick Leahy (VT). In the House, the Democrats
gained a whopping forty-three seats for a 291-144 majority. 63

The Class of

'74, which was among the youngest since the end of World War II, also had the
62 Peglow,
63

160-161.

Mary Cohn, ed., The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government,
Spring 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 1-6.
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largest number of freshmen congressmen since the Congress elected in
1948. 64

Overall, this gain of Democrats in the House and Senate, combined

with the reelection victories of liberal Senate Republicans such as Bob
Packwood (OR) and Jacob Javits (NY), contributed to a leftward shift in both
houses.

Democrats also won a net total of five gubernatorial races in 1974,

extending their majority in this category to 36-14, the largest differential
between the two parties since 1937.65
In looking at the geographical distribution of the 1974 vote (see Map 9),
one can see both similarities and differences between this election and the
Clark triumph of 1972. 66

Note first that Culver only won forty-seven

counties statewide compared with the seventy-three counties that Clark won
in 1972.
Luckily for Culver, three of the five counties that he won by very large
margins (those counties giving him over 60% of the vote) were the highly urban
counties of Linn, Johnson, and Dubuque. These were also counties in, or
bordering on, Culver's own Second District.

In fact, the northeast and east

central part of the state, i.e., the Second District, is one of the few sections
that Culver did well in as a whole.

Culver's best showing overall came in the

central section of the state in counties such as Polk, Dallas, Warren, Story,
Boone, Jasper, Marion, and Madison.

Culver also did well in a string of counties

bordering the Missouri River, a few counties in the southern two tiers, and five
counties in the north central part of the state.

Other than in those five places,

however, Culver won only a scattered county here or there.
Map 10 shows the relative percentage change for the senate seat that
64 1bid.,

7.

65 1bid.,

13.

66 Peglow,

160-161. Also Ahern, 162-163.
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Culver won in 1974 compared to how Hughes did in his race for the same seat
in 1968.67 The fact that Culver scored a percentage increase in seventy
counties over the Hughes percentages in 1968 shows that, even though Culver
ran in a very close election, the Hughes victory was much closer. Indeed,
Hughes beat Stanley by only a 50.4-49.6% margin.
When compared to the other Democrats running for statewide office,
Culver's 1974 victory was not as impressive as Clark's in 1972.

Clark won

almost 56% of the vote compared to 44% for all the other candidates running in
statewide races .

Culver only ran about six percentage points ahead of the

statewide Democratic ticket in 1974, a better than usual Democratic year in
the nation as a whole.

When comparing Culver's 1974 geographic distribution

of the vote against the geographic distribution of the vote for the 1974
Democratic candidate for Auditor (see Map 11 ), one can see that in only five
counties did both Culver and the Auditor candidate score between 50 and 59.9%,
Monroe, Dallas, Monona, Wapello, and Des Moines.68 In no counties did the
candidate for Auditor garner 60% or more of the Democratic vote .

In fact,

Culver ran about seven points ahead of the Auditor candidate, about the same
percentage ahead he ran against the Democratic ticket as a whole.
The three demographic characteristics used in analyzing the Clark/Miller
and Clark/Jepsen races (urban/rural, German ancestry, and religion) will also
be used to analyze the Culver elections in 1974 and 1980. For example, when
the data in Map 16 is combined with the average percentage of the Democratic
vote in the 1974 election, one can compare how well Culver did according to
Iowa,

67 L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register,
1969), 351-352. Also Peglow, 160-161.
68peglow, 166-167.

1969-1970 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of
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the degree of urbanism in Iowa's counties, as indicated in the table below.
Table 11.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1974
% Urban
% Dem. 1974
0-23 (n=23)
45.4
23-45.9 (n=44)
49.8
46-68.9 (n=19)
46.5
69-92.1 (n=13)
55.8

As happened with Clark in 1972, the more urban the county (with one
exception), the higher the average percentage Democratic.

Not surprisingly, the

most urban counties, those which were 69-92.1 % urban, gave Clark his highest
average percentages, coming in at 55.8%.

The category of counties which was

classified as most urban was the only category of counties which gave Culver a
higher average percentage of the vote than he received statewide.
No clear relationship between how German a county was (refer again to
Map 17) and the size of its Culver vote existed. The range of the average
percentages for Culver between the least German counties and the most German
counties was only four percentage points compared with the ten point range
found in Table 11.

Nevertheless, Culver did appear to do better in the most

German counties.
Table 12.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the 1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1974
% Urban
% Dem. 1974
0-4 (n=47)
49 .4
5-9 (n=31)
53.1
10-14 (n=14)
50.3
15-or more (n=7)
58.4
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The range was neither as large as Clark's 1972 range of average percentages of
the vote nor was the relationship between German ancestry and the Democratic
vote as clear.

Numbers such as these make it difficult to say that the more

German a county was the more likely it was to support Culver heavily or vice
versa.
Of the three religious denominations used in this study, the percentage of
a county's population classified as either Catholic or Methodist appear to show
the greatest correlation between a pro or anti-Culver vote in 1974.

According

to the table below, the range of the Culver percentage between the group of
least Catholic counties and the most Catholic counties (see Map 18) was about
thirteen points, far larger than the range for either urbanism characteristic or
German ancestry. This was also a larger range than Clark had for the same
counties in 1972.

In short, the more Catholic a county was, the more

Democratic it voted in the 1974 U.S. Senate contest.
Table 13.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1974
% Catholic
% Dem. 1974
4-14 (n=30)
43.8
15-29 (n=37)
49.4
30-44 (n=24)
51.4
45-81 (n=8)
57.1

The more Methodist a county was (see Map 20), the less likely its
residents would support Culver in 1974.

This is the same type of inverse

relationship seen with this characteristic that was displayed in the 1972 Clark
victory.

The range from the most to least Methodist counties was about seven

percentage points, larger than the range for the German/non-German
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characteristic but smaller than for the urban/rural or the Catholic demographic
characteristics.
Table 14.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1974
% Methodist
% Dem. 1974
3-14 (n=20)
50.9
15-26 (n=47)
49.8
27-38 (n=23)
47.4
39-56 (n=9)
44.1
Again, like the 1972 Clark election, the average percentages for the least
to the most Lutheran counties and their relationship to the Culver vote is less
clear, as seen in Table 15 below.

Whereas Clark received average majorities in

each of the four categories of counties in Map 19, Culver only received a
majority in one, that category of counties with 30-44% of their respective
populations classified as Lutheran.
Table 15.
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According
to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1974
% Lutheran
% Dem. 1974
0-14 (n=33)
49.4
15-29 (n=37)
47.7
30-44 (n=20)
50.6
45-71 (n=9)
48.0

Culver's narrow victory in 1974 meant that he might be vulnerable in his
1980 reelection bid.

Indeed, national parties often target senators for defeat

who won their initial elections to the Senate by a very slim margin.

There

have, however, been senators who have won narrowly in their initial contests
and then won by increasing margins in following elections.

If this had been all

that Culver had to worry about, there would not have been the anxiety that
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existed in his campaign in 1980.69

Some of the other factors that worried

Culver were the loss of Dick Clark (Culver's ideological twin) to a conservative
Republican two years earlier, the apparent success of the anti-abortion/profamily coalition in 1978 and their pledge to target Culver in 1980, the growing
unpopularity of the national Democratic party as a result of the poor economy
and the weak leadership of President Jimmy Carter, and the prospect of running
against popular Third District Congressman Charles Grassley, who had run
unopposed in 1978 and thus had a sizable war chest of funds at his disposal. 70
The most ominous forewarning of defeat for Culver was the unfavorable trend
in his approval ratings as measured by Iowa Polls taken since he had assumed
office .
Culver's
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Note in the graph on the previous page that, only once during his six-year
term (January of 1977), did Culver receive above 50% approval.

In every other

Iowa Poll in which Iowans were asked if they approved, disapproved, or had no
opinion of the job that John Culver was doing as U.S. Senator, Iowans always
responded with less than 50% approval.
final three approval ratings.

Probably more important are Culver's

In March and July of 1978 and in January of 1979,

Culver only managed to win the approval of 39%, 36%, and 38%, respectively. 71
In addition, instead of having high disapproval ratings, Culver had very large
percentages of Iowans who had no opinion, either good or bad, of him. The fact
that between 40 and 50% of the state's population had no opinion of him for his
entire six-year term was a sign that Culver's reelection chances were in doubt.
Because such large percentages had no opinion of Culver, Grassley could
manufacture unfavorable opinions of Culver more easily during the campaign by
molding public opinion in his favor.
Grassley, from the beginning, sought to paint Culver as out-of-touch with
the concerns and feelings of normal, everyday lowans.7 2

Grassley pointed out

that Culver had actually lived in the state for only a very short period of time
between his high school days and 1980.

He noted that Culver spent little time

in the state, especially when compared to Grassley's work as a farmer, teacher,
and factory worker in the state.7 3
his major selling points.

In fact, Grassley's rural image was one of

Grassley also accused Culver of being too liberal and

too much a part of the Democratically-controlled Congress, which Grassley
blamed for the nation's high inflation rate.

For his part, Grassley campaigned

71 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1977-1978, 878 and 902. Also Des Moines

Register, The Iowa Poll, 1979 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register, 1979), 926.
7 2Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A).
73 David Yepsen, "Grassley Roots Sunk Deep in Frugal Soil," Des Mojnes Regjster, 5 (A).
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on the Reagan platform, calling for increased defense spending and lower
taxes.7 4

These issues apparently worked in Grassley's favor, as he jumped out

to a substantial lead in the Iowa Polls taken in the summer of 1980.75
Culver met the Grassley attack head-on by forcefully defending his
liberal principles.7 6

Apparently, Culver believed that Clark two years earlier

had failed to appear passionately dedicated to liberalism and had wavered too
much under the weight of Jepsen's attacks.
mistakes that Clark had made.

Culver vowed not to make the same

He began by attacking Grassley for being too

conservative as well as an ineffective member of the Iowa Congressional
delegation. 77

In offering proof that Grassley was ineffective, Culver pointed

out that Grassley voted in opposition to the rest of the state's Congressional
delegation, Republicans included, on 612 House roll call votes in his six years
in that body. 78

Culver's forceful defense of himself and his ideology, coupled

with his attacks on Grassley, helped him regain the lead in the Iowa Polls taken
in the early fall. 7 9
By election day, the Register predicted that the race would be close, and,
after factoring in the undecided likely voters, the Register concluded that
Grassley would prevail by the narrow margin of 51.6% to 48.4%. 80 After all
the votes were counted, Grassley prevailed by a larger margin than expected,
winning 54% of the two-party vote. 81
74 Flansburg,

75

1980),

In the rest of the state, Republicans

"Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A}.

Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1980 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register,

990.

76 Hershey,
77 Flansburg,

223.
"Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A}.

78 1bid.
79 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll.
80 1bid.,
81

1980, 997, 998, and 1003.

1006.

Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed., Iowa Official Register. 1981-1982 (Des Moines, Iowa: The
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also did well, winning control of Iowa's Congressional delegation for the first
time since 1972. The Republican candidate for President, Ronald Reagan, won
Iowa with almost 58% of the two-party vote.

The GOP also retained control of

both houses of the Iowa General Assembly. 8 2
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Nationally, the Grassley win contributed to a Republican landslide.
Reagan won the Presidency with a forty-four state romp, rolling up a 489-49
margin in the electoral college.

In addition, the GOP captured control of the

Senate for the first time since since the 1947-48 session. 83

More important

than the increase in numbers that the Republicans had in the new senate was
the decidedly more conservative ideologies of many of the GOP's new senators.
State of Iowa,

1981), 146-147.
144-145 and 148-150. Also Charles Bullard and Bonnie Wittenburg, "GOP Mulls
Leader Posts After Legislative Takeover," Des Moines Register, 1 (A).
82 1bid.,

83 Nancy Lammers, ed.,

Spring 1981

The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government.

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,

1981), 7-11.
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In addition to Grassley's Iowa victory, conservative candidates won in
Washington, Idaho, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida,
North Carolina, and New Hampshire. The new faces in the Senate from those
states included Slade Gorton, Steve Symms, James Abdnor, Bob Kasten, Dan
Quayle, Jeremiah Denton, Mack Mattingly, Paula Hawkins, John East, and Warren
Rudman.

Some of the defeated liberal senators in addition to Culver included

Frank Church (ID), Birch Bayh (IN), Warren Magnuson (WA), and George McGovern
(SD).84 The GOP also gained seats in the U.S. House as well as picking up four
governorships. 85
In addition to the points that have been analyzed in the discussions of the
1972, 1974, and 1978 elections, i.e., the geographical distribution of the vote,
the senate race compared to the statewide Democratic ticket, and the taking
into account of the three demographic characteristics (urban/rural, German
ethnicity, and religion), one other point needs to be emphasized when analyzing
the Culver loss of 1980.

This other point is how well Culver fared in

Grassley's Third District and how well Grassley did in Culver's former Second
District.
Map 12, the geographical distribution of the vote in the Culver/Grassley
race, shows that Culver lost heavily in most areas of the state. 86 The only
area in which Culver consistently won was in the central Iowa counties of
Polk, Boone, Story, Webster, Dallas, and Warren.

Culver also did fairly well in

Monroe, Wapello, Des Moines, Lee, Linn, Johnson, and Dubuque counties. Overall,
Culver won only thirteen of the state's ninety-nine counties.
84 lbid.

14-19 and 23-24.
B6Gautchier, 146-147.
B51bid.,

Interestingly,
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when Map 12 is compared to Map 5 (the geographical distribution of the vote in
Clark's 1978 loss), one notices that the Culver loss was much more widespread
than the Clark loss, as evidenced by the fact that, in 1980, Culver had fortyeight counties that supported him with 20.7-39.9% of the vote while Clark had
only seventeen counties in that category.

On the whole, both Clark and Culver

retained the counties in central Iowa the best.
Map 13 shows the relative percentage change in the Democratic Senate
vote from 1974 to 1980.87

Notice that Culver's percentages suffered the

most in the western one-fourth of the state as well as in east central,
northeast, and north central Iowa.

Note also that east central, northeast, and

north central Iowa is the area that contains the Second and Third Congressional
Districts.

Map 14, showing the absolute percentage gain or loss for Culver

from 1974 to 1978, shows much the same phenomenon as Map 13, i.e., Culver
lost much support in the areas contained in his and Grassley's Congressional
Districts as well as in the western one-quarter of the state.BB

In fact, the

average percentage that Culver received in both can be seen in the following
table.
Table 16.
Culver's Average Percentage of the Vote in the
Second and Third Congressional Districts, 1974 and 1980
% Dem. 1974
District
2nd
55.0
3rd
48.3
Statewide
52.4

% Dem. 1980
43.3
35.2
46.0

Absolute Change
-9.1
-13.1
-6.4

Relative Change
-21.3
-27.1
-12.2

As the table above suggests, Culver lost substantially in the Second and
87 1bid.

Also Peglow, 160-161.
BBGautchier, 146-147.
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the Third Congressional Districts, two areas that he probably needed to do well
in if he were to have any chance of winning reelection.

Interestingly, Culver

lost a larger percentage, both absolute and relative, in the Second District than
he lost in the state as a whole.

Similarly, Culver's 13.1 % absolute point loss

and his 27.1 % relative point loss in the Third District is directly related to
Grassley's success as a Congressman there and his popularity in the area.
It is hard to compare the 1980 Culver/Grassley race with the statewide
Democratic ticket because in 1980 there was only one other statewide
election: the 1980 Presidential contest between President Carter and Ronald
Reagan.

This was the only other statewide contest because, after 1974, the

members of Iowa's Executive Council were elected every four years rather than
every two years thus making non-Presidential election years those in which
large numbers of candidates ran on a statewide basis.
Map 15 shows the percentage Democratic in the 1980 Presidential
election in Iowa. 89

Note that Carter and Culver had the same areas of

strength centered in the east central and central sections of the state.
well that Carter won a majority in only four counties:
Johnson, and Dubuque.

Note as

Wapello, Des Moines,

Statewide, Culver ran about three points ahead of

Carter, and judging by the great similarity in Maps 12 and 15, he ran about that
far ahead in most counties as well.
How did Culver's 1980 defeat compare to his 1974 victory in terms of the
three demographic characteristics being studied?

Did Culver suffer the most

at the hands of the same groups that contributed to Clark's 1978 loss?

The

relationship between the least urban to most urban counties and the 1980
Culver vote is outlined in the following table.
89 1bid.,

144-145.

Note that, in the most urban
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counties, Culver still garnered an average of 50% of the vote.

Even though this

constituted an absolute point loss of about six percentage points for Culver
compared to his 1974 average percentage, the voters in the most urban
counties tended to desert Culver in far smaller proportions than did those in
the less urban counties.
Table 17.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote
According to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980
% Urban
%
0-23 (n=23)
23-45.9 (n=44)
46-68.9 (n=19)
69-92.1 (n=13)

Dem. 1974
45.4
49.8
46.5
55.8

% Dem. 1980
36.2
40.2
41.3
50.0

Absolute Change
-9.2
-9.6
-5.2
-5.8

Relative Change
-20
-19
-11
-10

The Culver loss can definitely be linked to the urban/rural phenomenon.
The more rural a county was, the greater the possibility that Culver's would
lose heavily in that county.

This direct relationship between rural ism and

Culver's loss was much more apparent than in the case of Clark's 1978 loss
(refer to Map 1).
The information on German ancestry and the Culver vote in 1980 is
similar to the same information found in the 1978 loss of Clark to Jepsen, i.e.,
the most German counties showed a drop off in support of Culver from 1974 to
1980 that was twice as large as the drop off of the least German counties.
Instead of the most German counties being the most supportive of Culver as
they were in 1974, the least German counties became the strongest supporters
of Culver in 1980, even though they supported Culver with an average of only
42.6% (see the table below and refer also to Table 2).
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Table 18.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According to the
1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980
% Dem. 1974
% German
48.4
0-4 (n=47)
50.8
5-9 (n=31)
10-14 (n=14)
48.6
15-or more (n=7) 52.4

% Dem. 1980
42.6
39.2
38.8
39.6

Absolute Change
-5.8
-11.6
-9.8
-12.8

Relative Change
-12
-23
-20
-24

When comparing the Culver numbers on this subject to the Clark numbers, one
can see that the only difference between the two is that the relative
percentage change from 1974 to 1980 for the group of counties with 5-9% of
their respective 1885 populations classified as German was larger than for the
group of counties with 10-14% of their populations German.

This put a break in

the size of the percentage drops for the Culver numbers whereas the Clark
numbers showed increasing relative percentage decreases of 9%, 16%, 20%, and
21 % from the least German to the most German counties.
In 1974 Catholic counties were Culver's strongest supporters, Methodist
counties were his weakest supporters, and Lutheran counties were somewhere
in between.

Remember also that, in considering Clark's 1978 loss, the voters

in Catholic counties deserted Clark in far larger numbers than did the voters in
Methodist counties, a phenomenon that may have been linked to abortion. The
notion that the Culver defeat was similar to the Clark defeat on the issue of
religion is only partially true.

For example, the more Catholic a county tended

to be, the greater likelihood that Culver's average percentage would drop by a
large amount.

This happened in the Clark defeat as well.

One big difference

between the two elections needs to be mentioned, however.

In the case of

Culver, the least Catholic counties (4-14% Catholic) abandoned him at a very
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high rate (-18%) and, in fact, deserted Culver at a higher rate than the counties
that were 15-29% and 30-44% Catholic.

This makes the relationship between

highly Catholic counties and large anti-Culver voting in 1980 less clear than
the same information for the anti-Clark vote in 1978.
Table 19.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According
to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980
% Catholic % Dem. 1974
4-14 (n=30)
43.8
49.4
15-29 (n=37)
30-44 (n=24)
51.4
45-81 (n=8)
57.1

% Dem. 1980
35.7
42.5
44.1
41.5

Absolute Change
-9.2
-6.9
-7.3
-15.6

Relative Change
-18
-14
-14
-27

As with the Clark defeat of 1978, Culver lost much less support among
heavily Methodist counties than he did in counties where Methodists were a
small part of the church membership.

It should be noted, though, that the most

Methodist counties gave Culver such a low average percentage of the vote in
1974 that the relatively small percentage decrease in 1980 was because the
starting point was so low.

At any rate, the more Methodist a county was the

more loyal it remained to Culver in 1980.
Table 20.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According
to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980
% Methodist % Dem. 1974
50.9
3-14 (n=20)
15-26 (n=47)
49.8
27-38 (n=23)
47.4
39-56 (n=9)
44.1

% Dem. 1980
38.4
42.4
40.4
38.2

Absolute Change
-12.5
-7.4
-7.0
-5.9

Relative Change
-25
-15
-15
-13

44
As to the question of whether or not the abortion issue played a role
similar to that in the 1978 election is unclear because the Register took no
poll in either 1979 or 1980 that dealt specifically with religion and the
abortion issue.

Aside from that, however, the Register reported that, in a poll

taken as voters left the polling places, 10% of the Grassley voters voted for
him because of his tough, pro-life position. 90

If these voters would have

voted for Culver otherwise, then the poll might be relevant, but there is no
proof that this group would have modified its voting behavior in this manner.
What is clear from this study, however, is that single issue voters can make a
difference in close elections, but those voters are hard to identify and
quantify .
As with the 1972, 1974, and 1978 elections, there is no evidence of a
clear relationship between Lutheran church membership and 1980 voting
behavior in the Culver-Grassley contest.
Table 21.
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According
to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980
% Lutherans % Dem. 1974
49.5
0-14 (n=33)
15-29 (n=37)
47.7
50.6
30-44 (n=20)
45-71 (n=9)
48.0

% Dem. 1980
44.4
38.2
41.5
36.4

Absolute Change
-5.1
-9.5
-9.1
-11.6

Relative Change
-10
-20
-18
-24

An interesting point to consider in the Culver/Grassley election is the fact
that the most Lutheran counties deserted Culver in larger numbers than did
counties with relatively small Lutheran populations as can be seen in the table
below.

Note as well that the -24 % relative loss almost reached the levels of

9°Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A).
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the relative loss in the most Catholic counties.

A possible explanation for this

huge relative percentage decrease is the large number of heavily Lutheran
counties located in Grassley's Third District, an area where he dominated
Culver.

conclusion
The political and emotional setback suffered by the Iowa Democratic
Party hierarchy and its activists as a result of the defeats of Clark and Culver
in the 1978 and 1980 elections, coupled with the loss of majority control in
both houses of the Iowa General Assembly, left many party loyalists wondering
whether or not the success of the party and its candidates in the 1960s and
1970s was simply a temporary phenomenon.
that line of thinking was not correct.

Later events would indicate that

The Democratic Party in Iowa, by the end

of the 1970, had achieved too much through superior organization (voter
identification and get-out-the-vote programs) to return to the days of being
the GOP's perennial punching bag.

Indeed, the 1980s would show that the Iowa

Democratic Party would rebound and be victorious in many county, state, and
national races.
At the same time, the defeats of Clark and Culver produced attempts
within the party at the time to better understand the reasons for the two
candidates' lack of success in winning second terms.

Inevitably, this led to

talk of similarities between the types of persons Clark and Culver were
ideologically when compared to their two conservative opponents, Jepsen and
Grassley.

One major weakness in simply looking at the two races as two

liberals being replaced by two conservatives in a period of apparently
increasing conservatism in the country is that this approach failed to take into
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account the striking differences in the situational contexts surrounding the
two men and their political careers.

This study has suggested that the two

sets of races were similar in limited respects but strikingly different in
others.
This study has also attempted to determine the relationships, if any,
between voting behavior and various demographic characteristics.

Through this

type of empirical analysis, the author found that a plausible explanation for the
victories of Jepsen and Grassley are that they did a good job of prying away
some of Clark's and Culver's natural bases of power, such as Catholics,
Germans, and those Living in the state's urban areas.
least in 1978, also played a role.

The abortion issue, at

Although this type of study cannot

conclusively show the reasons for the election or defeat of either candidate, it
can point to possible, or even probable, reasons.
Clark's victory in 1972 over Jack Miller was definitely a surprise because
Clark was virtually unknown in many parts of the state, he had to compete in
the Nixon landslide year, and he was running against a two-term senator who
had won by a relatively wide margin in 1966.

Likewise, Clark's defeat in 1978

was also a surprise because he had been held in such high esteem by his fellow
Iowans, according to a variety of Iowa Polls taken throughout his term.

In

addition, Clark ran against an opponent, Roger Jepsen, who had only lukewarm
support from members of his own party, especially from those within the
moderate wing of the state's GOP led by Governor Robert Ray.

Indeed, it was

widely believed at the time of his announcement that Jepsen's time in the Iowa
political spotlight had come and gone.

In spite of his apparent advantages,

Clark lost to Jepsen in a race that may have hinged on Jepsen's ability to
attract enough single-issue voters to band together in an anti-Clark coalition.
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The two elections involving Culver were held in very different
circumstances.

In 1974, Culver, already an immensely popular member of the

U.S. House of Representatives from Iowa's Second Congressional District, ran
for an open seat held by Harold Hughes, a member of his own party.

In addition,

the Watergate scandal and the downfall of the Republican President made
Culver's electoral chances much better.

Finally, Culver's opponent, David

Stanley, was only fairly well-known throughout the state (certainly not as
well-known as Clark's first opponent, Miller) and had already been unsuccessful
in a previous try to win a seat in the U.S. Senate.

Despite all of these

advantages, Culver only beat Stanley by the barest of margins, not even coming
close to equaling the impressive showing of Clark two years earlier.
Unlike Clark, Culver failed to increase his own popularity during his six
years in the Senate.

This failure of Culver to solidify his position in public

opinion polls made him easy prey for Charles Grassley, himself an immensely
successful member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Iowa's Third
Congressional District.

The stories of both Clark and Culver, aside from being

interesting portraits of two of the state's (and the Iowa Democratic Party's)
most important political leaders in the second half of the Twentieth Century,
help us to better understand the nature of Iowa politics during the 1970s, a
volatile and exiting time in the state's history.
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Map 1.
Iowa's 99 Counties

11. Buena Vista
12.Butler
13. Calhoun
14. Carroll
15. Cass
16 . Cedar
17. Cerro Gordo
18 . Cherokee
19. Chickasa\t/
20. Clarke

21. Clay
22. Clayton
23. Clinton
24. Cra\t/ford
25. Dallas
26. Davis
27. Decatur
28. Dels\t/are
2 9. Des Moi nes
30. Dickinson
31. Dubuque
32 . Emmet
33. Fayette
34. Floyd
35. Frank:li n
36. Fremont
37. Greene
38. Grundy
39 . Guthrie
40 . Hami lton

4 1. Hancock:
42. Hardin
43. Harrison
44. Henry
45. Ho\t/ard
46. Humboldt
47. Ida
48. lo\t/a
49. Jackson
50. Jasper
51. Jefferson
52. Johnson
53 . Jones
54. Keokuk
55. Kossuth
56. Lee
57.Linn
58. Louisa
59. Lucas
60. Lyon

61. Madison
62 . Mahaska
63. Marion
64. Marshall
65. Mills
66. Mitchell
67. Monona
68. Monroe
69. Montgomery
70 . Muscatine
71. O' Brien
72. Osceola
73 . Page
74. Palo Alto
75. Plymouth
7 6. Pocahontas
77.Polk:
78. Potta\t/attamie
79. Po\t/eshiek
80. Ringgold

81. Sac
82 . Scott
83. Shel by
84. Sioux
85. Story
86. Tama
87. Taylor
88 . Union
89 . Van Buren
90 . Wapello
91 . Warren
92. Washington
93. Wayne
94. Webster
95. Winnebago
96. Winneshiek:
97. Woodbury
98. Worth
99 . Wright
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Map 2.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties
for Cl ark-Mill er 1972 Election

D

31 .6-39.9% Democratic
(N=7)

~ 40-49.9% Democratic
~(N=19)

~ 50.1-59.9% Democratic
~ (N=64)

60-70.5% Democratic
(N=9)

Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed ., lo'w'a Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, lo'w'a : The Stete of
lo'wa, 1973), 163-164.
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Map 3.
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the
U.S . Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1966-1972

D

20-39 .9 percentage
increase ( N=35)

~ 40-59 .9 percentage

~increase ( N=42)

~ 60- 79.9 percentage
~increase ( N= 18)

80-99 percentage
increase ( N=4)

Source : L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of
Iowa, 1973), 163-1 64. Also Betty L. Lamberto, ed., Iowa Official Register, 196 7-1968 Vol . 52 ( Des
Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1967), 411-412.
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Map 4.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties
for State Audi tor's Race, 1972

D

20 .7-39.9% Democratic
(N=61)

~ 40-49.9% Democratic
~ (N=35)

~ 50-59.9% Democratic
~(N=3)

60% or more Democratic
(N=O)

Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of
Iowa, 1973), 168-169.
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Map 5.
Democratic Percentage of the Vole in Iowa Counties
for Cl ark-Jepsen 19 7 8 El e cl ion

D

25.2-39.9% Democratic
(N=17)

~ 40-49.9% Democratic

~(N=59)

~ 50.1-59.9% Democratic
~(N=22)
60-67% Democratic
(N=l)

Source: The State of lows, Cenve,, of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978 (De, Moine,, lows: The
State of Iowa, 1978), n.p.
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Map 6.
Rel alive Change in the Democratic Percentage of the
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

D

0-7 percentage
increase ( N=5)

~ 1-15 percentage
~decrease (N=54)

~ 16-29 percentage
~decrease (N=36)

30-38 percentage
decrease ( N=4)

Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa : The State of
Iowa, 1973), 163- 164. Also The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978
( Des Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1978), n.p.
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Map 7.
Absolute Change in the Democratic Percentage of the
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978

D

0.0-3.2 point gain
(N=5)

~ 0.9-6.0 point loss
~(N=36)

~ 6.1-12 .0 point loss
~(N=39)
12. 1-19.9 point loss
(N=18)

Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed., low'a omcial Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 ( Des Moines, low'a: The State of
low'a, 1973), 163-164. Also The State of low'a, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978
( Des Moines, low'a: The State of low'a, 1978), n.p.
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Map 8.

Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties
for State Auditor's Race, 1978

D

17.7-39 .9% Democratic
(N=53)

~ 40-49.9% Democrat;c
~(N=39)

~ 50-59 .9% Democrat;c
~(N=6)
60-62.8% Democratk
(N=l)

Source: The State of lo'vla, Canvass of the Vote: General Electfon November 7, 1978 (Des Mo;nes, lo'vla: The
State of lo'vla, 1978) , n.p.
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Map 9.

Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties
for Culver-Stanley 1974 Election

D

27.3-39.9% Democratic
(N=l 1)

~ 40-49.9% Democratic
~ (N=41)

~ 50.1-59.9% Democratic
~ (N=42)
60-68.9% Democratic
(N=S)

Source: Pam Peglow, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 ( Des Moines, Iowa: The State of
Iowa, 1975), 160- 161.
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Map 10.
Rel alive Change in the Democratic Percentage of the
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1968-1974

D

13-27 percentage
decrease ( N=2)

~ 1-12.9 percentage
~ decrease ( N=27)

~ 0-11.9 percentage
~increase ( N=51)

12-24 percentage
; ncrease ( N= 19)

Source: Pam Peglo\tl, ed., lo\tla Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 ( Des Moines, lo\tla: The State of
lo\tla, 1975), 160- 161. Also L. Dale Ahern, ed ., lo\tla Official Register, 1 969- 1 970 Vol . 53 ( Des
Moines,lo\tla: TheStateoflo\tla, 1969), 351-352.
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Map 11 .

Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties
for State Auditor's Race, 197 4
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D

23-39 .9% Democratic

~50-59 .9% Democratic

(N=34)

~(N=9)

~ 40-49.9% Democratic

~(N=56)

60% or more Democratic
(N=O)

Source: Pam Peglow, ed ., Iowa Official Register, 1975- 1976 Vol. 56 ( Des Moines, Iowa : The State of
Iowa, 1975), 166- 167.
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Map 12.

Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties
for Culver-Grassl ey 1980 Election

D

20 .7-39.9% Democratic
(N=48)

~ 40-49.9% Democratic

~(N=38)

~ 50 .1-59.9% Democratic
~(N=12)
60- 68.1 % Democratic
( N= 1)

Source: Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1981-1982 Vol . 59. ( Des Moines, Iowa: The
State of Iowa, 1981), 146-147.
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Map 13.
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 197 4-1980

1- 12 percentage
; ncrease ( N=8)

~ 16-29 percentage
~ decrease (N=41)

~ 1-15 percentage
~decrease (N=36)

30-41 percentage
decrease ( N= 14)

D

Source: Mart) Ellen GautcMer, ed., Iowa omdal Regfater, 1981-1982 Vol. 59. ( Des Mo;nes, Iowa: The
State of Iowa, 1981), 146- 147. Also Pam Peglow, ed., Iowa omc;a1 Regfater, 1975- 1976 Vol. 56 ( Des
Mo; nes, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1 9 75), 160- 161 .
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Map 14.
Absolute Change in the Democratic Percentage of the
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 197 4-1980

D

0.0-5.1 point gain
(N=B)

~ 0.9-6.0 pointloss
~ (N=26)

~ 6.1-12.0 point loss
~(N=38)

12.1- 22.0 point loss
(N=27)

Source: Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1981 - 1982 Vol. 59. ( Des Moines, Iowa: The
State of Iowa, 1981), 146-147. Also Pam Peglow, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 ( Des
Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1975), 160-161.
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Map 15.
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties
in Presidential Race, 1980
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20-39.9% Democratic

~ 50-59. 9% Democratic

(N=47)

~(N=4)

~ 40- 49. 9% Democratic
~ (N=48)

60% or more Democratic
(N=O)

Source: Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed ., Iowa Official Register, 1 981-1982 Vol. 59. ( De, Moine,, Iowa : The
State of Iowa, 1981), 144- 145 .
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Map 16.
Percentage of Population Classified as "Urban"
for Iowa Counties, 1980

D

0-22 .9% (N=23)

~23-45.9% (N=44)

~ 46-68.9% (N=l 9)
69-92.1% (N=13)

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of PoP.ulation, 1980, part 17,
General PoP.ulation Characteristics : Iowa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), 17-17
to 17-18and 17-232to 17-240.
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Map 17.
German-Born Population of Iowa Counties, 1885

D

0-4% of county's total
1 885 population ( N=47)

~ 5-9% of county's total

~ 1885 population (N=31)

~ 1 0-14% of county's total
~ 1 885 population ( N= 1 4)
15% or more of county 's
totel 1885 pop . (N=7}

Source: The State of lo'w'e, Census of lo'w'e for the Veer 1885 (Des Moines, lo'w'e : The Stete of lo'w'e, 1885},
164-166.
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Map 18.
Catholics as a Percentage of Total Church Members
in Iowa Counties, 1980

D

4-14%
(N=30)

~ 30-44%
~ (N=24)

~

15-29%
~ (N=37)

45-81 %
(N=8)

Source: National Council of Churches of Christin the U.S .A., Churches end Church Membershi P. in the United
States, 1980: An Enumeration by~gion, State, end County Based on Date ReP.orted by 111 Church Bodies
(Atlante, Georgi 8 : GlenmHy Research Council, 1 982}, 1 02-111 .
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0-14%
(N=33)

~ 15-29%
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~30-44%
~ (N=20)
45-71 %
(N= 9)
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Churc by 111 Church Bodies
U.S.A.,B~ese~don Dete
. el Counc1·1 of Churches o. f Christin
Stete, e..n,the
..d County
"...............
Source : Net1on
eretion by Reg1on,_
82) 1 02- 111.
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Map 20.
Methodists as a Percentage of Total Church Members
in Iowa Counties, 1980

D

3-14%
(N=20)

~27-387'
~(N=23)

~15-26%
~(N=47)

39-567'
(N=9)

Source: National Council of Churches of Christin the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membershi P. in the United
States, 1980: An Enumeration by~gion, State, end County Based on Date ReP.orted by 111 Church Bodies
(Atlante, Georgie: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 1 02-111.
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